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By Democratic Audit
Prisoner voting for the final general election before release is
a solution that balances concerns about democratic rights
Democratic Audit has recently featured analysis of prisoner voting rights from several leading experts. In the
second of two new contributions to this debate – following Peter Ramsay’s earlier post – Chris Bennett and
Daniel Viehoff argue that both sides of the debate can make strong claims to democratic principles. They
make a new proposal that aims to balance these competing concerns.
We were recently invited to give evidence to the Joint Committee on the Draf t Voting Eligibility (Prisoners)
Bill. The Committee was set up to scrutinise the UK Government’s response to the repeated decisions of
the European Court of  Human Rights that the indiscriminate removal of  the right to vote f rom those who
receive a custodial sentence exceeds the legit imate ‘margin of  appreciation’ the UK has to interpret and
apply the rights asserted in the European Convention.
One thing that was clear was that the polit icians are sore at having been brought to this point by polit ical
pressure f rom the European Court second-guessing national sovereignty. Westminster f aces having to
revise its treatment of  prisoners or else violate the Convention, the f ear being that the latter option would
give succour to regimes who may want to commit more serious human rights abuses. Whatever one thinks
about the sovereignty issue and the process by which this question has been put on the polit ical agenda,
however, this presents the Government with a good opportunity to set its policy on prisoner voting on a
more principled f ooting.
Of  course, practical concerns will inf luence the polit icians’ f inal decision. But at the heart of  the matter
there are two philosophical questions: Why do we have voting rights in the f irst place? And how can we lose
them? Having investigated these questions of  principle, however, it will be important to consider a third
question: what would the likely consequences be of  the policy, independently of  its grounding in attractive
principle?
The draf t Bill sets out three options: 1) leave the blanket ban on prisoner voting unchanged; 2) prisoners
lose the vote when sentenced f or longer than six months; or 3) prisoners lose the vote when sentenced
f or f our years or more. We argued that only the third would be anywhere near f air. However, we don’t think
democracy requires that prisoners retain the right to vote. Rather, we accept that a democratic case can be
made f or disenf ranchising those who violate central democratic values, including respect f or f ellow cit izens
(see Peter Ramsay’s argument). These reasons f or disenf ranchisement need to be balanced, though,
against concerns of  democratic legit imacy and opportunit ies f or rehabilitation. For this reason we proposed
a f ourth option: that prisoners should be able to vote in the f inal (general) election bef ore their release,
thus meaning, in the current scheme of  things, that no one serving less than f ive years would lose the right
to vote.
There are three main reasons why an individual or a group might have voting rights in the f irst place –the
good of  the vote-holder themselves; the good of  others; or to ensure the legit imacy of  the laws. Which
interests of  the vote-holder might be served by having the vote? Firstly, it might be an interest in exerting
some measure of  control, however, small, over the laws under which one lives. Or secondly, it might be an
interest in being treated as a polit ical equal in one’s community, particularly in communities where all other
adults have the right to vote. Imagine a small ethnic minority have the vote removed because they never
exercise it. This is to treat them as second-class cit izens even if  the vote never served to protect their
interest in controlling the laws they live under.
If  we turn, secondly, to the interests of  others that are served by any individual having the vote, we argue
that universal enf ranchisement tends to improve the quality of  the law. We all have an interest in living in a
just society, under laws that ref lect the legit imate interests of  all relevant parties (however the relevant
interests are to be determined). Universal enf ranchisement makes it less likely that MPs enact unjust laws.
This is partly because those whose interests will be seriously injured by a policy will likely vote against it.
But more importantly, they will argue against it, and persuade other cit izens to also oppose a law that they
recognize as unjust. Couldn’t they argue against it even if  they don’t have voting rights? Sure. But would
they be listened to? MPs, and polit ically active cit izens, have a f ar greater incentive to pay attention to the
views of  those who can vote than those who can’t. Even if  one thinks that those who commit of f ences
should suf f er some punishment, prisoners, as prisoners, have legit imate interests that should be
represented in the f ormulation of  law. Enf ranchisement of  prisoners is the best way to do so.
Thirdly, the right to vote also plays an important role in establishing the state’s moral right to exercise
power over its subjects. Historically, the liberal-democratic polit ical tradit ion has f ocused on consent as the
proper basis of  the state’s legit imate authority. But as a matter of  f act, very f ew of  us have (or even could
have) f reely consented to the authority of  our state. The opportunity f or participation provided by the right
to vote has been deemed a f unctional substitute f or consent: those who have the right to vote and thus to
participate in our collective decision-making may thereby have acquired a duty to obey the law, and liability
to the state’s coercive power, that is (within certain limits) similar to that which would have f ollowed f rom
consent.
For various reasons, then, the f ranchise represents a weighty right that should not be taken away without
important cause. Nevertheless, there are reasons in f avour of  removing the f ranchise that have to be
balanced against those just given. Two types of  answer are worth considering here.
A forward-looking response points to some f uture ill that removal of  the vote serves to prevent. For
instance, even f undamental rights can be removed or suspended in t imes of  emergency, or when a person
poses a signif icant and unavoidable danger to others. However, it is not clear that prisoners having the
vote poses signif icant danger, or that even if  it  did, it would be all and only prisoners who we should
disenf ranchise on such grounds. Furthermore, countries like the UK eschew competency tests and operate
a def ault universal enf ranchisement. Disenf ranchising on these grounds would represent a marked
departure f rom this liberal posit ion.
By contrast a backward-looking response points to the appropriateness of  disenf ranchisement as a
response to the gravity of  the crime itself . For instance, a backward- looking response might be the idea
that disenf ranchisement is a suitable f orm of  punishment. For this argument to work, disenf ranchisement
would have to be linked to accepted purposes of  punishment. Does it help deter crime? Only if  people cared
enough about losing the vote, and if  it  were publicised that it was lost, neither of  which is the case? Does it
incapacitate? Well, yes, but not in such a way as to meet conditions of  necessity and proportionality. Does
it rehabilitate? As Nicola Lacey argues in another Democratic Audit post on this subject, we should in f act
expect the reverse: disenf ranchisement can simply f urther alienate already marginalised groups f rom
integration into mainstream society. Does it serve legit imate retribution? We argued that the strongest
punitive justif ication f or disenf ranchisement is in f act this retributive response, and, in particular, that we
should have some sympathy f or the idea that distancing oneself  f rom intolerable violations of  the basic
duties of  cit izenship (serious crimes) requires the removal of  some of  the basic f orms of  treatment
cit izens can normally expect. Thus we can imagine a small self -governing association f inding it quite f itt ing
to suspend the voting rights of  a member who has grievously violated the duties of  mutual respect that go
with membership. This would be an act of  inclusion rather than simple exclusion, a way of  af f irming that, as
a member, he is held to certain standards of  behaviour. By analogy, a democratic state is f ounded on
certain values and has to hold its members accountable to treating one another in accordance with those
values. Furthermore, more broadly speaking, we should support f orms of  punishments that are more
symbolic and less directly harmf ul, in which case disenf ranchisement may have its place.
Disenf ranchisement can theref ore, in some circumstances, be an appropriate vehicle f or legit imate
condemnation of  those who have committed serious crimes. Nevertheless it also needs to be recognised
that, in circumstances of  inequality and social exclusion, it can also serve to communicate to already
disadvantaged and marginalised people that they have no stake in the power exercised over them.
Furthermore, it denies a class of  cit izens the ability to consent to the polit ical power that will be exercised
over them once their sentence has been served. Finding a policy on this question will theref ore always be a
matter of  balancing and trade-of f s of  values. The policy suggestion we made to the Committee was that
an attractive way f orward is to give prisoners the right to vote in the f inal general election (and presumably
local and European elections) bef ore their release. That can serve rehabilitative purposes, and means that
power exercised over them will be legit imate. But it will also mean that the rich symbolism of
disenf ranchisement can be deployed in order to mark those serious crimes that someone with the rights
and competences of  cit izenship should never have committed.
Note: This post represents the views of the author, and does not give the position of the London School of
Economics or Democratic Audit. Please read our comments policy before commenting.
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